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The Nonproliferation Regime
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The Nonproliferation Regime |
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The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) represents three basic bargains. The first is encapsulated in Articles One, and Two of the treaty. They prohibit states with nuclear weapons from transferring them or the means to make them to states that lack nuclear weapons, and ban nonweapons states from acquiring them. The second NPT bargain is set forth in Articles Three, Four and Six. These articles stipulate that the nuclear weapons states will negotiate in good faith to disarm and will share the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy with nonweapons states. In exchange, the nonweapons states pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons and to allow international inspections of their civilian nuclear facilities and materials to verify whether non-nuclear weapons states are in compliance with the treaty and are not diverting peaceful nuclear activities or materials to make nuclear weapons.
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May 30, 2013 |
Greg Jones: Iranian Uranium Enrichment Passes into Israel's Redline
In various papers since 2008, this author has outlined how Iran's growing centrifuge enrichment program could provide it with the ability to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and thereby the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. On May 22, 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its latest safeguards update, which shows that Iran has continued the rapid expansion of its enrichment program.
Working Papers
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May 14, 2013 |
Victor Gilinsky: Sometimes Major Violations of Nuclear Security Get Ignored
The traditional justification for accepting nuclear power activities around the world, despite their obvious technological overlap with military ones, is that they are covered by agreements restricting them to “peaceful uses,” and that any violations of these agreements would be detected in time by international inspectors or by national intelligence. The trouble is, even when solid information on violations is available early enough, the main countries on whose action international enforcement depends are sometimes reluctant to take needed action.
Working Papers
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May 06, 2013 |
America's 1962 Reactor-Grade Plutonium Weapons Test Revisited, Greg Jones
In 1977, the U.S. declassified the fact that in 1962 it had successfully tested a nuclear weapon using reactor-grade plutonium. In 1994 additional information about this test was released. Though on the face of it this test would seem to definitively settle the issue about whether reactor-grade plutonium can be used in nuclear weapons, ironically the specifics related to this nuclear test have generated some of the most controversy.
Working Papers
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Apr 08, 2013 |
Robert Zarate: The Non-Use and Abuse of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence in the Cases of North Korea and Iran
One of the key assumptions shared by backers of military counter-proliferation is that with enough timely intelligence, the U.S. and its key allies can bomb, interdict, sabotage, and otherwise neutralize the nuclear weapons efforts of proliferating states. The presumption here is that it is the supply of intelligence, rather than the timely use and demand for it from policy makers and military planners, that is preventing more robust counter-proliferation activity.
At some level this certainly must be true. Yet, in the important current cases of Iran and North Korea, it is nowhere near as important as the demand problem. The attached NPEC-commissioned study by Robert Zarate, Policy Director of the Foreign Policy Initiative, "The Non-Use and Abuse of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence: The Cases of North Korea and Iran," makes this case forcefully. His conclusion, after detailing what is known about how we have used the intelligence we had on these programs, is that if we are unwilling to act on the basis of early proliferation information when only modest actions are needed, it is a mistake to assume we will be more likely to act later when more heroic measures are required.
Working Papers
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Apr 05, 2013 |
National Review Online Posts NPEC Analysis, "Pyongyang Is Not Our Only Nuclear Worry"
Op-Eds & Blogs
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Mar 19, 2013 |
Henry Sokolski Book Review: Atoms for Peace: Catalyzing Bombs for Cheats
NPEC's executive director reviews Atomic Assistance: How "Atoms for Peace" Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity, by Matthew Fuhrmann, in the March 2013 edition of The Nonproliferation Review.
Articles
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Mar 19, 2013 |
Greg Jones: Iran Could Get Two Bombs in Four Months
In various papers since 2008, this author has outlined how Iran’s growing centrifuge enrichment program could provide it with the ability to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and thereby the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. On February 21, 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its latest safeguards update which shows that Iran has continued its rapid expansion of its enrichment program.
Working Papers
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Feb 25, 2013 |
Victor Gilinsky and Henry Sokolski: Serious Rules for Nuclear Power without Proliferation (Working Paper 1302)
Working Papers
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Feb 12, 2013 |
National Review Online Posts NPEC Analysis, "After North Korea's Test: Slow the Nuclear Dominos"
Op-Eds & Blogs
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Dec 17, 2012 |
Serious Rules for Nuclear Power without Proliferation (video)
Presentation at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies.
Audio & Video
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The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), is a 501 (c)3 nonpartisan, nonprofit,
educational organization
founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues. NPEC educates
policymakers, journalists,
and university professors about proliferation threats and possible new policies and measures to meet them. |
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1601 North Kent Street | Suite 802 | Arlington, VA 22209 | phone: 571-970-3187 | webmaster@npolicy.org
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