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Nuclear Abolition & The Next Arms Race
As the U.S. reduces its nuclear arsenal, what might the next arms race look like? Assuming current nuclear trends continue, the next two decades will test America’s security and that of its closest allies as they never have been tested before. Before 2020, the United Kingdom could find its nuclear forces eclipsed not only by those of Pakistan, but of Israel and of India. Soon thereafter, France may share the same fate. read more
Sep 24, 2014 National Review Online posts NPEC analysis, "A Plutonium-Rich Asia"
On September 24, 2014, National Review Online posted NPEC Executive Director's article "A Plutonium-Rich Asia"
Op-Eds & Blogs
Dec 30, 2012 Victor Gilinsky & Roger Mattson: Revisiting the NUMEC Affair
 Originally published in the spring of 2010. 
Articles
Aug 02, 2012 Susan Voss: Tracking Nuclear Proliferation within a Commercial Power Program
    As speculation rises about if and when Israel might strike Iran's nuclear program, it's worth considering how Iran got to where it is now with its program. Iran started in earnest with its nuclear efforts by initiating a nuclear power reactor construction program at Bushehr. Such "peaceful" projects are "bomb starter kits" in a number of ways. First, the reactors themselves can be used to make significant quantities of nuclear weapons-usable plutonium. Second, and easily as important in Iran's case, they can be used as covers to acquire the training, equipment, material, and technologies needed to do far more than boil water.     This latter point is one that President Bill Clinton and Ambassador John Bolton both emphasized. Specifically, though, what does it mean? Attached is an NPEC working paper by Susan Voss, "Tracking Nuclear Proliferation within a Commercial Power Program," which tells the tale in critical detail. Ms. Voss, who was an analyst at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and is currently the President of the Global Nuclear Network Analysis, LLC, is one of the nation's top experts on Iran's civilian nuclear program and how Iran used it to acquire all that it needed to edge ever closer to acquiring nuclear weapons. It's quite revealing how brazen Iran was in using its program to secure Russian nuclear fuel and nuclear weapons-related technology and training in relative plain sight. By revealing and analyzing these transactions, Ms. Voss also spotlights what the intelligence requirements must be for any serious nonproliferation effort. This is an area we still need to work on.
Working Papers
Jun 28, 2012 Matthew Fuhrmann: Preventive War and the Spread of Nuclear Programs
In Foreign Affair's most recent featured cover article, "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb:  Nuclear Balancing Would Be Stabilizing", the author, Ken Waltz, imagines a peaceful proliferated Persian Gulf. Putting aside the improbability of the kind of automatic nuclear balance the author presumes between Israel and Iran, Dr. Waltz ignores just how militarily provocative states' efforts to get the bomb have been. This history is detailed and assessed in the attached NPEC-commissioned analysis by Dr. Matthew Furhmann of Texas A&M entitled, “Preventive War and the Spread of Nuclear Programs".  It makes for sober reading. In the last three decades, the U.S., Israel, Iran, and Iraq have planned or executed preemptive military strikes against Israel, Iran, Iraq, Syria and North Korea.  Over 10 military strikes were executed.  Going back further in history, the list of serious preemptive strikes and plans is much longer. It is also interesting to note that a good number of the targeted nuclear programs that Dr. Furhrmann's covers in his study were "peaceful" and safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency.  This hardly argues well for the further expansion of nuclear power in the Middle East. It certainly is not the picture of proliferated "stability" that Dr. Waltz propounds.
Working Papers
Jun 13, 2012 Frank Gaffney interviews Greg Jones on Iran's progress with its nuclear program
Secure Freedom Radio's Frank Gaffney interviewed Greg Jones of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. Greg now calculates that Iran could produce a bomb, if it chose, in as little as 5-14 weeks.
Interviews; Audio & Video
Jun 07, 2012 Greg Jones: Iran's Rapid Enrichment Progress
In Greg Jones' latest evaluation of the IAEA's May 25th Iran safeguards report, he notes that in the last six months, Iran increased its production of 3.5% enriched uranium by roughly 60%. In addition, Iran installed 1,000 new centrifuges at its fortified Fordow facility. As a result, Greg now calculates that Iran could produce a bomb, if it chose, in as little as five to fourteen weeks.  
Working Papers
Jun 05, 2012 Scott Kemp: Centrifuges: A new era for nuclear proliferation
NPEC asked Associate Research Scholar at Princeton University and a Former Science Advisor on nonproliferation for the U.S. Department of State Scott Kemp to write a study on centrifuges. Scott explains that centrifuge technology can be fairly easily developed  in a matter of 36 months using a Soviet-like design and gives both technical and historical evidence for this.
Working Papers
May 26, 2012 Matthew Kroenig: The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?
NPEC asked Council on Foreign Relations Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow and Georgetown University assistant professor of government Matthew Kroenig to review the bidding.  His take and bottom line is that such nuclear optimism always was strained, that it remains far less popular out of academe than in and with cause. 
Working Papers
Apr 04, 2012 François Heisbourg: How Bad Would the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons Be?
François Heisbourg, chairman of IISS, presented a preliminary version of this paper at a conference, "Reassessing Nuclear Nonproliferation's Key Premises," cohosted by NPEC and the Legatum Institute in London, Great Britain, November 3-4, 2011.
Working Papers
Apr 02, 2012 The Next Arms Race
NPEC's executive director presented this updated version of "The Next Arms Race" at a Hamilton Society lecture given at George Mason University March 29, 2012
Presentations
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The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), is a 501 (c)3 nonpartisan, nonprofit, educational organization
founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues. NPEC educates policymakers, journalists,
and university professors about proliferation threats and possible new policies and measures to meet them.
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