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Working Papers
Sep 28, 2014 Greg Jones: Ensuring the Iran Negotiations Do Not Promote the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
NPEC Senior Researcher Greg Jones argues the P5+1 should toughen its stance and demand that Iran give up all centrifuge enrichment, dismantle the Arak reactor, give up its heavy water stocks, and dismantle its heavy water production facility.  He argues that allowing Iran to retain its nuclear capabilities can inflict enduring damage on broader U.S. nonproliferation efforts by legitimizing centrifuge enrichment or heavy water plutonium production reactors for other countries as well, making it easy for them to produce nuclear material for weapons whenver they desire them.
May 05, 2014 Greg Jones: Washington's "Comprehensive Solution" to Iran's Nuclear Program: Destined to be Neither
Negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program are continuing in an effort to produce a follow-on agreement, termed the “Comprehensive Solution,” to the November 2013 “Joint Plan of Action” (JPA).  Much of the discussion of the Comprehensive Solution has focused on the terms such an agreement should include to prevent Iran from being able to produce nuclear weapons.  However, this objective will not be attainable unless the agreement addresses key aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, fixes the flaws in the JPA which seriously constrain any agreement and recognizes fundamental problems with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as currently implemented.
Sep 10, 2013 Greg Jones: Tehran Could Get Its First Bomb Now in Just Six Short Weeks
  In various papers since 2008, this author has outlined how Iran’s growing centrifuge enrichment program could provide it with the ability to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and thereby the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. On August 28, 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its latest safeguards update which shows that Iran is continuing to expand its enrichment program.     
May 30, 2013 Greg Jones: Iranian Uranium Enrichment Passes into Israel's Redline
In various papers since 2008, this author has outlined how Iran's growing centrifuge enrichment program could provide it with the ability to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and thereby the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. On May 22, 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its latest safeguards update, which shows that Iran has continued the rapid expansion of its enrichment program. 
May 14, 2013 Victor Gilinsky: Sometimes Major Violations of Nuclear Security Get Ignored
The traditional justification for accepting nuclear power activities around the world, despite their obvious technological overlap with military ones, is that they are covered by agreements restricting them to “peaceful uses,” and that any violations of these agreements would be detected in time by international inspectors or by national intelligence. The trouble is, even when solid information on violations is available early enough, the main countries on whose action international enforcement depends are sometimes reluctant to take needed action.
May 06, 2013 Greg Jones: America's 1962 Reactor-Grade Plutonium Weapons Test Revisited
In 1977, the U.S. declassified the fact that in 1962 it had successfully tested a nuclear weapon using reactor-grade plutonium.  In 1994 additional information about this test was released.  Though on the face of it this test would seem to definitively settle the issue about whether reactor-grade plutonium can be used in nuclear weapons, ironically the specifics related to this nuclear test have generated some of the most controversy.  
Apr 08, 2013 Robert Zarate: The Non-Use and Abuse of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence in the Cases of North Korea and Iran
One of the key assumptions shared by backers of military counter-proliferation is that with enough timely intelligence, the U.S. and its key allies can bomb, interdict, sabotage, and otherwise neutralize the nuclear weapons efforts of proliferating states. The presumption here is that it is the supply of intelligence, rather than the timely use and demand for it from policy makers and military planners, that is preventing more robust counter-proliferation activity. At some level this certainly must be true. Yet, in the important current cases of Iran and North Korea, it is nowhere near as important as the demand problem. The attached NPEC-commissioned study by Robert Zarate, Policy Director of the Foreign Policy Initiative, "The Non-Use and Abuse of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence: The Cases of North Korea and Iran," makes this case forcefully. His conclusion, after detailing what is known about how we have used the intelligence we had on these programs, is that if we are unwilling to act on the basis of early proliferation information when only modest actions are needed, it is a mistake to assume we will be more likely to act later when more heroic measures are required.
Mar 19, 2013 Greg Jones: Iran Could Get Two Bombs in Four Months
In various papers since 2008, this author has outlined how Iran’s growing centrifuge enrichment program could provide it with the ability to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and thereby the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. On February 21, 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its latest safeguards update which shows that Iran has continued its rapid expansion of its enrichment program.  
Feb 25, 2013 Victor Gilinsky and Henry Sokolski: Serious Rules for Nuclear Power without Proliferation (Working Paper 1302)
Victor Gilinsky, former Commissioner of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of NPEC, propose five nonproliferation principles to establish a framework for dealing with the main deficiencies in the current NPT regime. This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form has been published in The Nonproliferation Review, © 2014 Taylor & Francis; The Nonproliferation Review is available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10736700.2014.880268
Sep 10, 2012 Greg Jones: Is the West Playing a Game With Iran That It Has Already Lost?
As Iran's nuclear program progresses, policy and opinion makers have crowded the airwaves pleading either to negotiate a "solution" or, more recently, to bomb or sanction Iran's nuclear activities away. The presumption is that the "window of vulnerability" for Iran's nuclear-weapons related activities has not quite closed, and that there's still time before Tehran "gets" the bomb.     This, however, may be wishful thinking. In his most recent analysis of Iran's nuclear activities, "Is the West Playing a Game With Iran That It Has Already Lost?", NPEC's Senior Researcher, Greg Jones, makes a convincing case that negotiating a deal with Iran or launching a military strike to prevent it from acquiring a quickly reconstitutable bomb option is no longer possible. As for sanctions, they are unlikely to block Iran's further nuclear progress.     This, Jones argues, may explain why, after a year of Israeli agitation for a military strike and extensive international efforts to cut a diplomatic deal with Iran, nothing has happened.     Jones' key recommendation, and one that has received far too little attention, is that the U.S. and other key nuclear supplier states focus on preventing future Irans. Specifically, Jones recommends that the strictures against making nuclear fuel contained in the United States-United Arab Emirates (UAE) civil nuclear cooperative agreement of 2009 be applied to all civilian nuclear cooperation with states that lack nuclear weapons. As Jones explains, if no action is taken to tighten existing nuclear controls, Iran and other states are likely to push ahead with "declared" nuclear fuel making activities producing a world full of Irans.
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The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), is a 501 (c)3 nonpartisan, nonprofit, educational organization
founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues. NPEC educates policymakers, journalists,
and university professors about proliferation threats and possible new policies and measures to meet them.
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