Atoms for Peace, the IAEA and the NPT:
Their Historical, Strategic Origins

A Presentation by
Henry Sokolski
Executive Director
The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center

www.npolicy.org

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Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
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J. Robert Oppenheimer
A REPORT ON THE

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

OF ATOMIC ENERGY

Prepared for

THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S COMMITTEE ON

ATOMIC ENERGY

by a Board of Consultants

Chester I. Barnard
Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer
Dr. Charles A. Thomas
Harry A. Winne
David E. Lilienthal, Chairman

Washington, D. C. March 16, 1946
IT IS possible that in the large light of history, if indeed there is to be history, the atomic bomb will appear not very different than in the bright light of the first atomic explosion. Partly because of the mood of the time, partly because of a very clear prevision of what the technical developments would be, we had the impression that this might mark, not merely the end of a great and terrible war, but the end of such wars for mankind.

Two years later Colonel Stimson was to write in Foreign Affairs, “The riven atom, uncontrolled, can be only a growing menace to us all . . .” In the same paragraph he wrote, “Lasting peace and freedom cannot be achieved until the world finds a way toward the necessary government of the whole.” Earlier, shortly after the war’s end, the Government of the United States had put forward some modest suggestions, responsive to these views, for dealing with the atom in a friendly, open, cooperative way. We need not argue as to whether these proposals were stillborn. They have been very dead a long, long time, to the surprise of only a few. Openness, friendliness and cooperation did not seem to be what the Soviet Government most prized on this earth.

It should not be beyond human ingenuity for us to devise less friendly proposals. We need not here detail the many reasons why they have not been put forward, why it has appeared irrelevant and grotesque to do so. These reasons range from the special difficulties of all negotiation with the Soviet Union, through the peculiar obstacles presented by the programmatic hostility and the institutionalized secretiveness of Communist countries, to what may be regarded as the more normal and familiar difficulties of devising instruments for the regulation of armaments in a world without prospect of political settlement.

C.D. Jackson
Lewis Strauss
President Eisenhower
Robert Bowie
Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases

A. J. Wohlstetter, E. S. Hoffman, R. J. Lutz,
and H. S. Rowen

April 1954

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The RAND Corporation
James Wadsworth
1970 Without Arms Control

Implications of Modern Weapons Technology

by NFU Special Project Committee on Stability Through Arms Control

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Washington, D.C.
Frank Aiken
Osten Unden